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Behind the Scenes of Online Copyright Enforcement: 
Empirical Evidence on Notice & Takedown
SHARON BAR-ZIV & NIVA ELKIN-KOREN
Copyright enforcement was one of the early challenges to the rule of law on the 
internet and has shaped its development since the early 1990s. The Notice and
Takedown (N&TD) regime, enacted in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 
offered online intermediaries immunity from liability in exchange for removing 
allegedly infringing materials upon receiving notice from rights holders. The 
unequivocal power of rights holders to request removal and the strong incentives 
for online intermediaries to remove content upon receiving a such notice have 
turned the N&TD regime into a robust clean-up mechanism for removing any 
unwarranted content. 
The N&TD procedure applies to private facilities, makes use of proprietary 
software, and is administered by private companies. This enforcement procedure is 
nontransparent and lacks sufficient legal or public oversight. Unlike copyright 
enforcement in court, where decisions are made public, we know very little about 
the actual implementation of the N&TD regime: Which players make use of the 
system? Who is targeted? What materials get removed? How effective is the removal 
of infringing materials, and does it comply with copyright law?
This Article offers empirical evidence on the implementation of the N&TD 
regime based on the systematic coding and analysis of a large-scale data-set of 
removal requests sent to Google Search.
The findings shed light on the major changes that have taken place in copyright 
enforcement following the transition to the online arena over the past decade. 
Analysis of the data reveals that the N&TD procedure has been extensively used to 
remove noninfringing materials, and most removal requests pertained to allegedly 
inaccurate, defamatory, or misleading content. These findings raise serious 
concerns that the N&TD procedure is becoming fertile ground for misuse. 
Moreover, online enforcement is dominated by multinational companies, which 
prefer to target global intermediaries rather than attempt to remove materials 
hosted by local platforms. This may lead to underenforcement of copyright online, 
as the exclusive focus on removal of links to allegedly infringing materials may limit 
access to these materials, yet fail to actually remove these same materials. The local 
hosting platforms which facilitates access to repeat infringements, are widely known 
within the relevant community of users. This calls into question the effectiveness of 
this enforcement strategy. At the same time, however, the data demonstrates 
instances of overenforcement, where some materials have been removed on 
questionable grounds. Thus, the findings raise concerns over the implications of the 
N&TD regime for access to knowledge and freedom of speech. Overall, the study 
shows that in the absence of sufficient legal oversight, the N&TD regime is 
vulnerable to misuse, carrying consequences to copyright goals, access to justice,
and due process. By uncovering the invisible dynamics at work in online copyright 
enforcement, this Article may contribute to identifying the challenges facing 
policymakers in shaping online enforcement procedures and developing the 
appropriate measures to address them.
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INTRODUCTION
The Notice and Takedown (N&TD) regime, enacted in the U.S.
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), has become a prominent
standard of online copyright enforcement. Since the late 1990s, this legal 
regime has offered online intermediaries immunity from copyright 
liability, in exchange for removing allegedly infringing materials upon 
receiving a notice from rights holders.1
The principle premises of this legal regime have been adopted in 
many places outside the United States in online disputes concerning 
intellectual property rights, defamatory content, and to some extent in 
implementation of the controversial right to be forgotten.2 More 
                                                                                                                  
* Dr. Sharon Bar-Ziv is an Assistant Professor at Sapir Academic College, School of Law, 
and a Senior Research Fellow at the Haifa Center for Law and Technology, University of Haifa 
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Prof. Niva Elkin-Koren is the Director of the Haifa Center for Law & Technology and the 
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empirical study, and to Matan Goldblat for technical editing. 
We also thank Michael Birnhack, Neil Natanel, Orna Rabinovich-Einy, and Haim Ravia for 
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Empirical Research on Copyright Issues (Chicago-Kent College of Law, Chicago), the 2015 Early 
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1 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105–304, 112 Stat. 2860. In Europe, this 
legal regime is rooted in the Electronic Commerce Directive. See Council Directive 2000/31, On 
Certain Legal Aspects of Information Society Services, in Particular Electronic Commerce, in the 
Internal Market (“Directive on Electronic Commerce”), 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1.
2 Ana Azurmendi, The Spanish Origins of the European “Right to Be Forgotten”: The Mario 
Costeja and Les Alfacs Cases, INTERNET MONITOR 2014: REFLECTIONS ON THE DIGITAL WORLD
43 (2014).
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importantly, the DMCA has become a de facto global standard for 
addressing online copyright infringements, since the vast majority of 
removal requests are sent to global platforms, which are U.S.-based 
companies subject to the DMCA.3
The statutory safe harbor established under the DMCA was intended 
to strike a balance. On the one hand, it sought to address the growing 
difficulty of enforcing copyright online by providing online 
intermediaries strong incentives to collaborate with rights holders in 
detecting and removing infringing materials.4 On the other hand, it
sought to enable online intermediaries to facilitate the free flow of 
information without undue filtering and interference.5
Notwithstanding its significance, little is known about how the 
N&TD procedure is applied, what its impact is, and how it affects 
copyright enforcement and access to noninfringing materials. N&TD 
procedures lack transparency. They take place in private facilities and 
are administered by private companies.6 Moreover, these procedures are 
now implemented by algorithms: rights holders employ algorithms to 
track online infringements and to file removal requests with online 
intermediaries.7 Similarly, online intermediaries use automated systems 
to adjudicate and execute removal requests.8 These algorithms are 
opaque and are often kept confidential and protected by intellectual 
property.9 Overall, unlike copyright enforcement in courts, where 
decisions are made public, we know very little about the N&TD 
practice: Which players make use of the system? Which procedures are 
                                                                                                                  
3 See Jennifer M. Urban, Joe Karaganis & Brianna L. Schofield, Notice and Takedown in 
Everyday Practice, U.C. BERKELEY PUB. L. & LEGAL THEORY RES. PAPER SERIES 19 (2017) 
(noting that the DMCA’s N&TD framework has been “adopted in jurisdictions around the world” 
and “has now been ‘woven into the fabric’ of much of the Web world-wide”).
4 Id. at 17; S. REP. No. 105-190, at 20 (1998); H. R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 49 (1998).
5 Nicholas W. Bramble, Safe Harbors and the National Information Infrastructure,
64 HASTINGS L.J. 325, 355–9 (2013). See also In re Charter Commc’ns, Inc., 393 F.3d 771, 774 
(8th Cir. 2005) (explaining that the DMCA “was designed to strike a balance between the interests 
of ISPs in avoiding liability for infringing use of their services and the interest of copyright owners 
in protecting their intellectual property and minimizing online piracy”).
6 See id. at 8 (noting that N&TD relies on private notices and actions by private parties which 
has led it to operate “without public visibility into the practices of rightsholders, OSPs, and alleged 
infringers”).
7 Joe Karaganis & Jennifer Urban, The Rise of the Robo Notice, 58 COMM. ACM 28, 28–30 
(2015).
8 Annemarie Bridy, Copyright’s Digital Deputies: DMCA-Plus Enforcement by Internet 
Intermediaries, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE LAW 185 (John A.
Rothchild ed., 2016); Maayan Perel & Niva Elkin-Koren, Accountability in Algorithmic Copyright 
Enforcement, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 473, 517 (2016); Matthew Sag, Internet Safe Harbors and 
the Transformation of Copyright Law, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 499 (2017).
9 Jenna Burrell, How the Machine ‘Thinks’: Understanding Opacity in Machine Learning 
Algorithms, 3 BIG DATA & SOC’Y 1 (2016); see generally FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX
SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION (2015).
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applied and how? Who is targeted? What materials are removed? How 
effective is the N&TD procedure? And does it serve the goals of 
copyright law? 
This Article offers empirical evidence on these questions, based on 
the systematic coding and analysis of a large-scale random sample of 
10,000 removal requests sent to Google Search regarding allegedly 
infringing materials on .il websites.10
The findings show that, in effect, the unequivocal power of rights 
holders to request removals and the strong incentives for online 
intermediaries to remove content upon receiving such notice have turned 
the N&TD regime into a robust clean-up mechanism for removing any 
unwarranted content.11
The findings further demonstrate some of the risks involved in 
enabling a robust enforcement procedure that lacks sufficient legal 
oversight. More specifically, the study shows that the N&TD procedure 
has been extensively used to remove noninfringing materials, which had 
little to do with copyright. Hence, most of the DMCA removal requests 
analyzed in this study pertained to allegedly inaccurate, defamatory, or 
misleading content. These findings raise serious concerns that the 
N&TD procedure is becoming fertile ground for misuse. Even more 
troubling is that a significant number of such requests have been 
submitted by a single entity, taking advantage of the regulatory 
enforcement system for purposes other than those intended.12 These 
findings underscore the vulnerability to fraud and misuse of this 
nontransparent automated enforcement system. The automated removal, 
without scrutinizing the claims of the parties, led to overenforcement 
and ended up in the removal of noninfringing materials. 
At the same time, however, the findings raise doubts regarding the 
effectiveness of N&TD procedures for the removal of harmful online 
content. Online enforcement is dominated by a handful of repeat players, 
mostly multinational companies, and mostly administered by 
professional agents.13 The enforcement strategy revealed by the study 
shows that these players generally prefer to target global intermediaries 
rather than local platforms. This choice may lead to underenforcement. 
Indeed, the removal of links to allegedly infringing materials on global 
platforms may reduce access to these materials. Yet, this strategy fails 
to remove the infringing materials themselves from the hosting facilities. 
When the allegedly infringing materials are still available on popular 
                                                                                                                  
10 The domain “.il” is the domain code for Israel. Each notice can contain an unlimited number 
of removal requests; therefore, the analysis focused only on removal requests referring to Israeli 
domains. See infra Part II.A.
11 See infra Part III.B.1.
12 See infra Part II.B.2.
13 See infra Part II.B.3.
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websites, which are familiar to users who seek such materials, the 
effectiveness of this enforcement strategy becomes dubious.
Overall, the study shows that the privatization of copyright 
enforcement, as implemented by the N&TD procedures, has failed to 
give proper weight to the public interest. Given the strong incentives for
online intermediaries to promptly remove any material upon receiving a 
notice, the enforcement strategies employed by rights holders may lead 
to overenforcement and subsequently fail to advance copyright goals. 
The empirical research discussed in this Article offers a rare 
opportunity to explore the enforcement proceedings involving online 
intermediaries, which are normally concealed behind a veil of code.14 
This exploration might be important to better understand some key 
features of online copyright enforcement and the risks and opportunities 
involved. This may also carry some implications for enforcement 
involving online intermediaries in other fields, such as the right to be 
forgotten15 or defamation claims.16 In addition, this study offers a 
snapshot of online copyright enforcement. Despite the considerable 
recent popularity of empirical legal studies,17 empirical studies of 
copyright law have attracted relatively limited attention,18 and only a 
few empirical studies focus on copyright enforcement practices.19
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I introduces the legal doctrine 
governing the N&TD procedures. Part II presents the research findings 
                                                                                                                  
14 Perel & Elkin-Koren, supra note 9, at 517.
15 Azurmendi, supra note 2, at 43.
16 Mohamed Saeh, Online Defamation and Intermediaries’ Liability: International 1
(Sept. 30, 2012), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2191844 [https://perma.cc/A8ZF-T2YQ].
17 Christopher A. Cotropia & James Gibson, Copyright’s Topography: An Empirical Study of 
Copyright Litigation, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1981, 1983 (2014). 
18 Michael Heise, The Past, Present, and Future of Empirical Legal Scholarship: Judicial 
Decision Making and the New Empiricism, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 819 (2002); see also Michael 
Heise, The Importance of Being Empirical, 26 PEPP. L. REV. 807, 811 n.16 (1999); Matthew Sag, 
Empirical Studies of Copyright Litigation: Nature of Suit Coding 1 (Loyola Univ. Chi. Sch. of Law 
Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Research Paper No. 2013-017, 2013), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2697447 [https://perma.cc/5FCX-NTQE].
19 Sag, supra note 19, at 3 (describing how copyright cases are often mixed with other issues, 
so there are few empirical studies that properly focus on copyright litigation); Cotropia & Gibson, 
supra note 18, at 1982. For leading empirical studies conducted in the field of copyright litigation 
and serving as foundational works, see generally Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. 
Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549 (2008); Neil Weinstock Netanel, 
Making Sense of Fair Use, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 715 (2011); Matthew Sag, Predicting Fair 
Use, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 47 (2012); Matthew Sag, IP Litigation in U.S. District Courts 1994–2014,
101 IOWA L. REV. 1065 (2016); Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV.
2537 (2009); Matthew Sag, Fairly Useful: An Empirical Study of Copyright’s Fair Use Doctrine
(March 15, 2011), https://works.bepress.com/matthew_sag/11/ [https://perma.cc/4CPM-JTBX];
Kris Erickson & Martin Kretschmer, ‘This Video is Unavailable’: Analyzing Copyright Takedown 
of User-Generated Content on YouTube, 9(1) J. INTELL. PROP., INFO. TECH. & ECOM. L.
(forthcoming 2018),  (analyzing factors that motivate takedown of user-generated content on 
YouTube).
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on the implementation of the N&TD procedures in practice. Following 
a brief description of the methodology, this Part describes the scope of 
enforcement activity using the N&TD procedures and identifies the 
prominent players—blockbuster filers of removal requests and request 
targets. It further addresses the findings of potential system abuse, and 
examines whether and how the objectives of the copyright law are 
fulfilled. Part III analyzes the study’s findings, which shed light on the 
major changes in copyright enforcement over recent decades following 
the transition to automatic procedure. These changes may have a 
significant impact on access to knowledge and freedom of speech, 
advancing copyright goals, access to justice, and due process. By 
uncovering the invisible dynamics at work, this analysis can contribute 
to refining the challenges facing policymakers in regulating online 
enforcement mechanisms. 
I. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK: COPYRIGHT ENFORCEMENT BY 
ONLINE INTERMEDIARIES
A. The DMCA Safe-Harbor Regime
Copyright enforcement has presented one of the greatest challenges 
to internet laws and shaped their development since the early 1990s. The 
ease of copying and distributing copyrighted materials by every end user 
connected to the network, using widely available devices, such as 
computers, tablets, and smartphones, has made it extremely difficult to 
identify, prosecute, and obtain damages from copyright infringers.
This systematic enforcement failure20 generated heavy pressure on 
online intermediaries to actively remove allegedly infringing materials 
residing in their systems. At the same time, policymakers were 
concerned that holding online intermediaries liable for infringing 
materials posted by their users might result in massive liability that 
would have a chilling effect on investment in internet infrastructure and 
the development of interactive services.21
                                                                                                                  
20 The “enforcement failure” raised serious doubts as to the relevance of copyright law in the 
information era and the effectiveness and wisdom of the enforcement of these laws in their present 
form. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 928–29 (2005) 
(discussing the difficulty of enforcing copyright law with the development of technology);
Ben Depoorter, Alain Van Hiel & Sven Vanneste, Copyright Backlash, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 1251 
(2011) (discussing how enforcement of copyright laws against file sharing has been unsuccessful);
Eben Moglen, Anarchism Triumphant: Free Software and the Death of Copyright, FIRST MONDAY
(Aug. 2, 1999), http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/684/594 [https://perma.cc/
37H5-FZ7F] (discussing the difficulty of identifying what is copyrightable in coding and numbers);
Pamela Samuelson, Does Copyright Law Need to Be Reformed?, 50 COMM. OF THE ACM 19
(2007) (suggesting that copyright law should be reformed to be simpler).
21 See S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 8 (1998) (“Due to the ease with which digital works can be 
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Online intermediaries, often possessing deeper pockets than the 
direct infringers, soon became a target of copyright litigation. In 
Religious Technology Center v. Netcom, one of the first cases to decide 
the liability of internet service providers (ISPs), a federal district court 
ruled that although an ISP is not directly liable for copyright 
infringement committed by its users, it might be liable for contributory 
infringement if the provider knew or should have known of the 
infringement.22 This decision increased the legal uncertainty among 
online intermediaries regarding the scope of their copyright liability:
What constitutes knowledge of infringement? When are they required to 
act against infringing materials which have been made available by their 
users?
The “safe-harbor” regime, enacted by the DMCA in 1998, sought to
offer greater legal certainty by defining what sort of action is required 
of online intermediaries, and by limiting their liability to online 
infringements committed by their users.23 At the same time, the DMCA 
sought to address copyright infringement by encouraging online 
intermediaries to expeditiously remove allegedly infringing materials 
residing in their systems upon receiving a notice from the rights holder.24
The safe-harbor provisions established under Section 512 reflect a 
legislative bargain between online intermediaries and copyright owners. 
The law provides immunity to online service providers (OSPs)25 that 
host infringing materials of subscribers,26 or provide links to infringing 
                                                                                                                  
copied and distributed worldwide virtually instantaneously, copyright owners will hesitate to make 
their works readily available on the Internet without reasonable assurance that they will be protected 
against massive piracy. . . . At the same time, without clarification of their liability, service 
providers may hesitate to make the necessary investment in the expansion of the speed and capacity 
of the Internet. In short, by limiting the liability of service providers, the DMCA ensures that the 
efficiency of the Internet will continue to improve and that the variety and quality of services on 
the Internet will continue to expand.”).
22 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1373 (1995).
23 Niva Elkin-Koren, After Twenty Years: Revisiting the Copyright Liability of Online 
Intermediaries, in 26 THE EVOLUTION AND EQUILIBRIUM OF COPYRIGHT IN THE DIGITAL AGE 29, 30 
(Susy Frankel & Daniel Gervais eds., 2014).
24 Annemarie Bridy, Is Online Copyright Enforcement Scalable?, 13 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH.
L. 695 (2011).
25 The statutory definition of a service provider is broad and covers internet access providers. 
See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(B) (“[P]rovider of online services or network access, or the operator 
of facilities therefor.”). OSPs that provide any of these four types of online services are eligible for 
protection from liability for copyright infringement: (a) transitory digital network communication, 
where an OSP acts as a “mere conduit” in providing internet access; (b) system caching; 
(c) information residing on systems or networks at the direction of a user (including hosting); and 
(d) providing information location tools, such as links. Id. at §§ 512 (a)–(d). The N&TD procedures 
addressed by this Article concern only hosting facilities and information-location tools (the third 
and fourth safe harbors). 
26 Id. at § 512 (c).
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materials.27 Compliance is voluntary.28 OSPs that comply with the safe 
harbors are exempted from liability for damages, but not from injunctive 
or any other equitable relief.29 OSP’s are also exempted from liability 
for any claim based on the “good faith disabling of access to, or removal 
of, material or activity claimed to be infringing or based on facts or 
circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent,”30 provided 
that the OSP took reasonable steps to promptly notify the subscriber of 
the removal31 and complied with a counter notice if filed.32 To take 
advantage of any of the safe harbors defined by the law, OSPs must 
comply with certain statutory threshold requirements. The OSP must not 
interfere with “standard technical measures” applied by copyright
holders to protect their works, and must further reasonably implement a 
policy providing for the termination of repeat infringers.33
Additional requirements apply to OSPs engaging in hosting or 
linking to infringing materials. More specifically, Section 512(c) 
stipulates three conditions that an OSP must meet.34 First, an OSP must 
not have “actual knowledge” of infringing content or an activity using 
infringing content on its system,35 or be “aware of facts or circumstances 
from which infringing activity is apparent.”36 The latter is also known 
as the red-flag standard.37 Second, an OSP must not obtain a “financial 
benefit that is directly attributable to the infringing activity, in a case in 
which the service provider has the right and ability to control such 
activity.”38
Finally, OSPs must designate an agent to receive notifications of 
claimed infringements from copyright owners, register the agent with 
                                                                                                                  
27 Id. at § 512 (d).
28 Note that noncompliance with the terms prescribed by the law is not in itself grounds for 
holding the intermediary liable. The law provides the intermediaries with a safe harbor. To establish 
liability of an OSP for infringing materials of its users, it is necessary to show that an infringement 
has been committed and that the OSP is either directly or indirectly liable for the infringement. 
Furthermore, some exemptions and limitations under copyright law, such as fair use, may also 
apply. See Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright 1992–2012: The Most Significant Development?,
23 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 465, 494 (2013) (noting that providers may still 
invoke traditional copyright defenses).
29 17 U.S.C. § 512 (j).
30 Id. at § 512 (g)(1).
31 Id. at § 512 (g)(2).
32 Id. at § 512 (g)(3).
33 Id. at §§ 512 (a)–(d), (i).
34 Id. at §§ 512 (c)(1)(A)(i)–(iii).
35 Id. at §§ (c)(1)(A)(i), (d)(1)(A).
36 Id. at § (c)(1)(A)(ii). Upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, OSPs must 
expeditiously remove or disable access to the allegedly infringing materials from their systems. 
Id. at § (c)(1)(A)(iii).
37 Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 31 (2d Cir. 2012).
38 17 U.S.C. §§ 512 (d)(2), (c)(1)(B) (providing information-location tools and hosting 
services, respectively). 
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the Copyright Office, and implement the N&TD procedure as defined 
by law.39 Upon receiving notice from copyright holders or on their 
behalf, the OSP must act expeditiously to remove or disable access to 
the allegedly infringing materials.40 OSPs have no duty to actively 
monitor their services for infringing content. The burden to monitor and 
locate infringements remains with the rights holders.41
The N&TD procedure provided by the law reflects the statutory 
goals of the safe-harbor regime pertaining to the interests of copyright
holders, OSPs, and users. 
First, the N&TD procedure offers copyright holders a relatively 
inexpensive and fast process for enforcement of copyright online. A 
removal request offers a direct and efficient legal remedy that can be 
obtained by the rights holders themselves, allowing them to reduce the 
potential harm caused by the infringement without resorting to more 
cumbersome and costly legal procedures. Moreover, this sort of remedy 
(removal) is immediate and quick, while seeking an injunction in court 
might last longer and might not be cost effective.
Another purpose intended by the safe-harbor regime was to offer 
greater certainty to OSPs concerning their copyright liability and the 
necessary steps OSPs must undertake to avoid it.42 The statute provides 
detailed rules about the N&TD procedures. Accordingly, a copyright 
owner may send a notice to the OSP’s designated agent. Section 
512(c)(3) lists details to be included for the written notification to be 
effective, including contact information for the complaining party, 
identification of the allegedly infringing work and sufficient information 
to permit the OSP to locate it, and a statement that “the complaining 
party has a good faith belief that use of the material in the manner 
complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the 
law.”43 Upon receiving such notice, an OSP must respond 
“expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material that is 
claimed to be infringing.”44
Finally, the N&TD procedures offer some safeguards against 
unjustified removal of legitimate content. The unjustified removal of 
noninfringing materials may disrupt the delicate balance struck by 
                                                                                                                  
39 Id. at § 512 (c)(2). 
40 Id. at § 512 (c)(1)(C).
41 See id. at § 512(m) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed to condition the applicability 
of subsections (a) through (d) on . . . (1) a service provider monitoring its service or affirmatively 
seeking facts indicating infringing activity.”).
42 See S. REP. No. 105-190, at 36 (1998) (noting that Title II of the DMCA was designed to 
“provide[ ] greater certainty to service providers concerning their legal exposure for infringements 
that may occur in the course of their activities”). 
43 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3). 
44 Id. at § 512(c)(1)(C).
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copyright law between the interests of copyright holders in enforcing 
their rights, and the interest of users who seek to learn from works and 
build upon copyright materials. 
The DMCA anticipated potential abuse of the extrajudicial and 
unaccountable removal power rendered under the statute, and therefore 
included several safeguards. One such mechanism is a “counter notice,”
which allows a user to contest the removal request.45 To maintain its
immunity under the N&TD regime, an OSP is required to take 
“reasonable steps promptly to notify the subscriber that it has removed 
or disabled access to the material,”46 and promptly forward any counter 
notices from alleged infringers back to the original complainant.47
A counter notice must include the following: (A) a physical or electronic 
signature; (B) identification of the material removed and its former 
location; (C) statement under penalty of perjury that the user believes in 
good faith that the material was mistakenly removed; and (D) the user’s 
name, address, phone number, and consent to the jurisdiction of a federal 
district court.48 After a notice is challenged by the user, the OSP might 
be required to reinstate the materials if the right holder fails to notify the 
intermediary of the lawsuit within ten to fourteen days after filing.49 If a 
suit is filed, the content is removed until a judicial decision is made.
DMCA instructions, which are implemented by Google,50 provide 
the option to file a counter notice.51 Google enables online filing of 
removal requests, whereby the filer is asked to name the Google product 
her request relates to (for example, Google Search).52 The filer is 
cautioned that the original notice may be sent to the copyright holder if 
Google has reason to suspect the validity of the complaint, and also that 
Google may present information from the notice at Google 
Transparency Report (GTR) and Lumen.53
Another mechanism to protect against misuse of the unaccountable 
removal power rendered under the statute is that the right holder must 
                                                                                                                  
45 See id. at §§ 512(g)(2)–(3). 
46 Id. at § 512(g)(2)(A).
47 Id. at § 512(g)(2)(B).
48 Id. at § 512(g)(3).
49 Id. at § 512(g)(2). If, after ten to fourteen days, the complainant does not notify the webhost 
that it has filed a lawsuit, then the webhost must reinstate the contested material. Otherwise, the 
webhost risks losing its safe harbor and it may be found liable for the damages suffered by users 
whose content had been unlawfully restricted. Id. at § 512(g)(3).
50 How Google Fights Piracy, GOOGLE (July 13, 2016), https://drive.google.com/
file/d/0BwxyRPFduTN2TmpGajJ6TnRLaDA/view [https://perma.cc/FE58-QYVS].
51 17 U.S.C. §§ 512(g)(2)–(3).
52 Removing Content From Google, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/legal/
troubleshooter/1114905?hl=en#ts=1115655%2C1282900 [https://perma.cc/KN56-MLN4] (last 
visited Sept. 11, 2017).
53 Id.; see also infra notes 92–94 and accompanying text.
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state that he has “a good faith belief” that the targeted use was not 
“authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the law.”54 Any party 
who files a notice without such good-faith belief may be liable for 
damages.55
These statutory measures seek to protect the rights of alleged 
infringers not to have their content removed without legal justification.
These measures may further seek to protect the public interest in 
preventing groundless or arbitrary restrictions on freedom of expression. 
B. The DMCA in Practice 
In recent years, we have witnessed a dramatic change in the way the 
N&TD procedure is applied by online intermediaries. In response to the 
exponential growth of online piracy,56 copyright holders have developed 
automated systems to track online infringements and automatically file 
takedown notifications with online intermediaries (“robo notices”).57 As 
further shown by the current study, robo notices are largely outsourced 
to agencies that specialize in automatically detecting alleged 
infringements.58
To address the sheer volume of notices, online intermediaries have 
also adapted automated systems for administrating removal requests.
For example, Google enables filing a removal request through an online 
form59 which asks the filer to indicate, among others, the specific 
infringing link that Google is requested to remove. Following the filing, 
Google removes the link, as required by the DMCA.60
More importantly, besides removal of infringing materials, some 
intermediaries have undertaken measures which exceed their legal 
obligations under the N&TD regime, and voluntarily offer additional 
enforcement measures to rights holders.61 For instance, Google takes 
                                                                                                                  
54 17 U.S.C. § 512 (c)(3)(v).
55 Id. at § 512(f).
56 See Annemarie Bridy and Daphne Keller, U.S. Copyright Office Section 512 Study: 
Comments in Response to Notice of Inquiry 2 (Mar. 30, 2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2757197
[https://perma.cc/ANE9-ZJ2C] (“Since the DMCA was enacted, the scale of online piracy has 
increased, and with it the number of legitimate DMCA requests—the bulk of them going from large 
copyright owners to large OSPs.”).
57 See Karaganis & Urban, supra note 8, at 28–30 (discussing how automated systems are 
being used to track online infringements and initiate N&TD procedures).
58 See infra Figure 4.
59 Removing Content from Google, supra note 53.
60 See Jennifer M. Urban, Joe Karaganis & Brianna L. Schofield, Notice and Takedown: 
Online Service Provider and Rightsholder Accounts of Everyday Practice, 64 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y
371 (forthcoming 2018).
61 See Bridy, supra note 9, at 189–91 (discussing the proactive monitoring and 
graduated-response protocols adopted by several of the largest ISPs, including YouTube and 
Google); Caleb Donaldson, Beyond the DMCA: How Google Levarages Notice and Takedown at 
Scale, LANDSLIDE, Nov./Dec. 2017 at 20–23.
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voluntary measures against websites which are the target of a high 
number of removal requests.62 Google’s Pirate algorithm, revised in 
2014, modifies its search results so that sites subject to a large number 
of removal requests are assigned a low rank at the bottom of the search 
results, where it is difficult to find them. YouTube’s Content ID is 
another classic example.63 Using a digital identifying code, Content ID 
can notify rights holders whenever a newly uploaded video matches a 
work that they own.64 Rights holders can then choose to block or remove 
the content, share information, or monetize the content.65 Voluntary 
measures may also include filtering the content before it is even 
uploaded, or takedown and staydown, which may involve an active 
search to make sure the content is not reuploaded.66
These voluntary measures have created a new arena for enforcing 
copyright, which operates parallel to the traditional arena of lawsuits 
filed in court.67 Moreover, these measures are arguably exempted from 
the checks and balances crafted under the DMCA, as they take place on 
privately owned platforms, are often offered as a service to the right
holder, and are governed by the intermediary’s terms of use.68
Another important development is the globalization of the N&TD 
procedures. Over the two decades that have passed since Congress 
enacted the DMCA, the safe-harbor regime has become a global 
standard. First, the N&TD procedure has inspired many countries 
outside the United States and has become the go-to model in disputes 
concerning the infringement of intellectual property rights, and more.69
For instance, the European E-Commerce Directive70 introduced similar 
safe-harbor exemptions, but did not specify any takedown procedure. 
Second, beyond its influence as a model, the DMCA operates as the de 
                                                                                                                  
62 Id.; Amit Singhal, An Update to Our Search Algorithms, GOOGLE (Aug. 10, 2012), 
https://search.googleblog.com/2012/08/an-update-to-our-search-algorithms.html
[https://perma.cc/7LKR-BW6U].
         63 See YouTube Help, YouTube Content ID, YOUTUBE (Sept. 28, 2010),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=6&v=9g2U12SsRns [https://perma.cc/N8T4-
5EJJ] (describing YouTube’s process for protecting copyright holders).
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Bridy, supra note 9, at 190, 195–96.
67 Perel & Elkin-Koren, Accountability, supra note 9 (highlighting the distinction between 
regulated mechanisms of algorithmic copyright enforcement and voluntary mechanisms of 
algorithmic copyright enforcement).
68 Id.
69 See Miquel Peguera, The DMCA Safe Harbors and Their European Counterparts: 
A Comparative Analysis of Some Common Problems, 32 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 481 (2009). 
70 Council Directive, supra note 1.
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facto global standard since the majority of the removal requests are sent 
to U.S.-based companies.71
Israel is no exception. The N&TD procedure has been developed in 
Israel through case law. Like many jurisdictions outside the United 
States, Israeli law has no clear statutory framework that governs the 
N&TD procedure. The N&TD principles arise from the legal doctrine 
of contributory liability. In the landmark case of Hebrew Univ. of 
Jerusalem v. Schocken, the Israeli Supreme Court defined the scope of 
contributory liability in copyright cases.72 Accordingly, liability for 
contributory infringement will apply when one knowingly and 
materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another. Israeli courts 
have applied the doctrine of contributory infringement to online 
intermediaries, holding that intermediaries will not be held directly 
liable for infringing materials posted by their users, but might be held 
liable if they knowingly contributed to the infringement. In the lower 
instances, Israeli courts have adopted the principle that hosting providers
(i.e., online forums) and website managers should not be held liable for 
harmful content published by their users if they had no knowledge of the 
violation, and if they acted to remove the harmful material as soon as 
they learned about it.73 Therefore, similar to U.S. law, online 
intermediaries might be subject to contributory liability for copyright 
infringing materials posted by their subscribers if they fail to remove the 
materials upon receiving a notice.74
Moreover, the top-ranked websites in Israel (e.g., Google, 
Facebook, YouTube) are owned by U.S.-based companies that 
implement the safe-harbor procedures of the DMCA.75 Consequently, 
the N&TD procedure applies de facto to many online interactions in 
Israel, including those involving Google—which was explored in the 
present study.
                                                                                                                  
71 Id. at 22 (citing Mary Meeker, Internet Trends 2014, at 130 (2014), 
http://www.kpcb.com/blog/2014-internet-trends [https://perma.cc/8C76-2CE2]); see also Council 
Directive 2000/31, 2000 O.J. (L 178/7) (stating that the intermediaries will be liable for copyright 
infringement if a notice has been filed, but there is no detailed arrangement which is similar to the 
DMCA).
72 CA 5977/07 Hebrew Univ. of Jerusalem v. Schocken Publ’g Ltd. 64(3) PD 740 (2011) 
(Isr.). Note that liability for contributory copyright infringement under Israeli case law requires 
actual knowledge of the infringing acts. Constructive knowledge would be insufficient for 
establishing liability.
73 CC (TA) 1559/05 Gilad v. Netvision Inc. (July 23, 2009) (Isr.); CC 64045/04 Magistraes 
Court (TA), “Al HaShulhan” Gastronomic Center v. ORT Israel (May 10, 2007) (Isr.).
74 CC (CT) 567-08-09 ALIS, Ass’n for the Protection of Cinematic Works v. Rotter.net Ltd. 
(Aug. 8, 2011) (Isr.).
75 SIMILARWEB, https://www.similarweb.com/top-websites/israel [https://perma.cc/F4WG-
CX9Y] (last visited Jan. 11, 2018).
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Since the N&TD procedure implemented by Google for content 
available in Israel is the same as the one implemented for content 
available in the United States, the Israeli case study offers an opportunity 
to explore how the N&TD procedure of the DMCA has shaped online 
copyright enforcement and access to online materials. 
Since its enactment, the DMCA has remained controversial and 
subject to widespread criticism by both rights holders and free-speech 
advocates. Scholars have warned against the chilling effect of the safe 
harbor as its use has expanded beyond the protection of copyright.76
Others have argued that, overall, the N&TD regime offers a relatively 
balanced solution to the online-enforcement challenge.77 Several studies 
point to flaws in the implementation of the N&TD procedure, arguing 
that its implementation may violate freedom of expression on the 
internet, obstructs academic research, endangers the fair use of works, 
and prevents competition and new invention.78 Copyright holders, on the 
other hand, argue that N&TD falls short of addressing online piracy, 
demanding that online intermediaries do more to protect their 
intellectual-property rights.79
However, little is known about how the N&TD procedures were 
actually implemented by copyright holders and online intermediaries,
and how they affect copyright enforcement and access to online 
                                                                                                                  
76 See Jennifer M. Urban & Laura Quilter, Efficient Process or “Chilling Effects”? Takedown 
Notices Under Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUT.
& HIGH TECH. L.J. 621, 687–88 (2006) (“The surprising number of questionable takedowns we 
observed, taken in conjunction with the ex-ante removal of content, . . . suggest that few are 
wellserved by the current § 512 process, and some or many individuals, as well as public discourse 
and the Internet’s value as an expressive platform, may be harmed.”); Timothy Cahn & Ryan 
Bricker, Rough Justice: Extending the DMCA’s Self-Policing “Take-Down” Model Beyond 
Copyright Law, GOLDEN GATE U. SCH. L. DIGITAL COMMONS (2012) (discussing how the DMCA 
leads to takedowns without notice to the user or opportunity to object, as well as without the 
protection of a cause of action for owner misrepresentation).
77 See, e.g., Jerome H. Reichman, Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Pamela Samuelson, A Reverse 
Notice and Takedown Regime to Enable Public Interest Uses of Technically Protected Copyrighted 
Works, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 981, 994 (2007).
78 See Fred Von Lohmann, Unintended Consequences: Twelve Years Under the DMCA, ELEC.
FRONTIER FOUND. 1 (Mar. 3, 2010), https://www.eff.org/files/eff-unintended-consequences-12-
years.pdf [https://perma.cc/X4X8-2X6D] (discussing how the DMCA has not been used as it was 
originally intended); Elkin-Koren, supra note 24, at 14 (describing how the N&TD procedures 
enable intermediaries to limit expression by exercising control over the use of content). 
79 See Comments of the Motion Picture Ass’n of Am., Inc. 3 (Nov. 13, 2013), submitted in IN
THE MATTER OF REQUEST FOR COMMENTS ON DEP’T OF COM. GREEN PAPER, Docket No. 
130927852-3852-01 at 3, https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
Motion_Picture_Association_of_America_Comments.pdf [https://perma.cc/8UC4-VWXV]
[hereinafter “MPAA”] (“All stakeholders in the Internet ecosystem—including search engines, 
advertising networks, payment processors, and cloud storage providers—should be actively seeking 
to reduce support for infringing websites. These parties should be engaging in serious discussions 
with copyright holders about taking commercially reasonable, technologically feasible steps to 
achieve that important goal.”).
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materials. The present empirical study, to which we now turn, seeks to 
fill this gap. 
II. UNCOVERING THE PRACTICES OF ONLINE COPYRIGHT 
ENFORCEMENT
A. Introduction and Methodology
This Part presents the findings of an empirical study of copyright 
enforcement facilitated by online intermediaries. The study analyzed 
requests filed with Google Search to remove links to allegedly infringing 
materials from its search results. This case study offers a snapshot of 
copyright enforcement in practice. This could help us better understand 
the way the DMCA is actually applied and how it shapes the digital 
environment (law in action), moving beyond the theoretical legal 
analysis (law in books).80
The study systematically analyzed a large-scale random sample of 
10,000 removal requests sent to Google Search regarding allegedly 
infringing materials on .il websites (Israeli websites). Israel serves as an 
instructive case study for drawing a detailed picture of the nature of 
copyright enforcement activities taking place through the N&TD 
regime. As noted, an N&TD procedure has been established by courts 
in Israel to address intermediaries’ liability for various harms, including 
copyright infringement. Moreover, the implementation of N&TD by 
global intermediaries, such as Google, reflects U.S. law and complies 
with the DMCA.81
Google Search is a significant, albeit not exclusive, tool to find 
information and acquire access to online content. Content not accessible 
through it or relegated to the bottom of the search results might be 
difficult to locate. Consequently, removing links to allegedly infringing 
materials from search results can significantly reduce the traffic on the 
site.
Google has become a central arena for enforcing copyright.82
Google regularly receives removal requests from apparent copyright 
owners to remove links to allegedly infringing materials from Google 
Search.83 Removal requests are conveyed to Google through an online 
                                                                                                                  
80 Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12, 15 (1910).
81 See infra Part II.A (discussing Google’s N&TD mechanism).
82 See Edward Lee, Recognizing Rights in Real Time: The Role of Google in the EU Right to 
Be Forgotten, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1017, 1080 (2016) (discussing Google’s handling of 
copyright removal notices in accordance with the DMCA).
83 Transparency Report, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/
copyright/?hl=en [https://perma.cc/7BVK-2GZE] (last visited Sept. 16, 2017).
356 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:2
form.84 Each request lists the relevant Google product,85 the sender’s 
name, the copyright owner’s name, and the particular webpages (URLs) 
that Google is asked to remove.86 After receiving the removal request, 
Google removes the link, as required by the DMCA to acquire the 
safe-harbor exemption.87
To promote transparency in its enforcement activities, Google
voluntarily publishes GTR on its website. The GTR presents data related 
to the removal requests received by Google from copyright holders, 
including information on the number of URL’s requested to be removed, 
the entities that sent the requests and the copyright owners. It further 
includes information on the allegedly infringing materials, and the 
manner in which the requests were addressed.88 Importantly, however, 
the data available in the GTR is incomplete in that it does not allow 
analysis of the removal requests themselves. In the current study, we 
used data derived from GTR only to analyze the scope of digital 
enforcement activity.89
In addition to the GTR, since 2002, Google has transferred the 
removal requests it receives to Lumen, a nonprofit organization that 
allows, among other things, extensive study of the removal requests.90
                                                                                                                  
84 Removing Content from Google, supra note 53.
85 Google enables filing removal requests which include activities carried out in a variety of 
platforms it owns, such as Blogger, Google+, Image Search, YouTube, and Web Search. See the 
full list at Removing Content from Google, supra note 53. See also Jennifer M. Urban, Brianna L. 
Schofield & Joe Karaganis, Takedown in Two Worlds: An Empirical Analysis, 64 J. COPYRIGHT 
SOC’Y 483, 494 (2018) (showing the top Google services represented in Lumen).
86 See id. (explaining Google’s content removal process). Each URL is stored under a specific 
domain name. See Requests to Remove Content Due to Copyright, GOOGLE,
http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/copyright [https://perma.cc/W7UB-4WH3]
(last visited Sept. 14, 2017) (displaying the total number of “top-level” domains). For example, the 
homepage address of the Center for Law and Technology at the University of Haifa,
http://weblaw.haifa.ac.il/he/Research/ResearchCenters/techlaw/ Pages/aboutus.aspx, is stored 
under the domain name of the Faculty Law at http://weblaw.haifa.ac.il.
87 Id.
88 Transparency Report, supra note 87. Although this data is published as part of Alphabet’s 
attempt to increase transparency regarding its activities, this database is incomplete and very 
complex. It consists of three main files: (1) Domains.csv file containing information regarding the 
suspicious domain names, the number of the suspicious URLs that are associated with each of them, 
their status, and ID of the removal request; (2) Requests.csv file containing information regarding 
the copyright holders, the sender of the removal request, link to the requests on Lumen’s website, 
date of receipt of the request, and ID of the request; and (3) A URL-no-action-taken.csv containing 
information regarding the address of the allegedly infringing URL, the domain name on which it is 
stored, and ID of the requests. Through union and intersection of the raw data found in these three 
files, we isolated the study group of this research: removal requests sent to Google concerning 
URLs associated with domain names identified as Israeli, i.e., with a .il extension.
89 See infra Part II.B.1 (analyzing the scope of the digital enforcement activity).
90 LUMEN, https://lumendatabase.org (last visited Sept. 16, 2017) (formerly known as 
“Chilling Effects”). The change of the organization’s name is described in Chilling Effects 
Announces New Name, International Partnerships, LUMEN BLOG (Nov. 2, 2015), 
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To expand the data analysis beyond the GTR data, we created a dataset 
of removal requests filed with Google that targeted URLs with the .il 
extension,91 extracted from the Lumen database. The dataset contains a 
random sample of the requests filed over a period of six months, 
between May and October 2013 (n=9,890). 
The following Section presents a data analysis of the 9,890 removal 
requests transferred to Lumen.92
B. Mapping the Digital Enforcement Arena
1. The Scope of the Digital Enforcement Activity
The scope of copyright enforcement, targeting Israeli domains, was 
extracted from the GTR. Figure 1 shows the distribution of requests filed 
with Google for the removal of allegedly infringing materials, 
specifically Israeli domain webpages, from search results between July 
2011 and December 2013.93 The number of requests filed rose fairly 
consistently from July 2011 to April 2012, after which there was a slight 
decrease until August 2012, followed by a mixed trend. Starting in 
March 2013, there was a significant increase in the number of removal 
requests submitted to Google, with a moderate decline in September 
2013.
                                                                                                                  
https://lumendatabase.org/blog_entries/763 [https://perma.cc/UAA3-VB4T]. The main emphasis is 
on the expansion of supervising the activity of content removal from the internet, not only on the 
basis of alleged intellectual property rights infringement and increase of the number of companies 
that cooperate with the organization and its international activity.
91 Each notice can contain an unlimited number of removal requests; therefore, the analysis 
focused only on those referring to Israeli domains.
92 Raw data analysis was conducted with a unique encoding engine. Urban, Karaganis & 
Schofield, supra note 3, at 80. In the course of the data collection it became clear that there are 
differences concerning the scope of the removal requests handled by Google relating to materials 
stored on Israeli domain names. These differences stem from the classification of the complaints it 
receives on a variety of other platforms. Together with the information published on GTR, 
including removal requests related to copyright infringement in the “search” category only, Google 
also transfers Lumen data regarding removal requests it receives on a variety of additional platforms 
such as Blogger, Google+, Image Search, and more. See Removing Content from Google, supra
note 53 (asking reporters of content to be removed from Google to “submit a separate notice for 
each Google service where the content appears”). This creates significant discrepancies. For 
example, according to Google’s data, some 7,000 removal requests have been filed against Israeli 
domains in the last three years. In the Lumen database, there are approximately 24,000 Israeli 
webpage addresses against which complaints were filed between May and October 2013 alone.
93 The graph shows the distribution of requests filed from July 2011 to December 2013. To 
avoid an edge effect, we do not present data before July 2011 or after December 2013. This is the 
reason for the gap between the 6,926 requests shown in the graph and the 7,091 requests filed 
according to the GTR.
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Figure 1: Distribution of Requests Filed with Google for 
Removal of Israeli Domain Webpages from Search Results, July 
2011–December 2013
This figure is consistent with Figure 2, which shows that the upward 
trend in removal requests in Israel (Figure 1) is similar to the worldwide 
trend.94
                                                                                                                  
94 Transparency Report, supra note 87. Reports indicate that eighteen removal requests are 
submitted to Google every second. Ernesto Van der Sar, Google Asked to Remove 18 ‘Pirate Links’ 
Every Second, TORRENTFREAK (Aug. 2, 2015), https://torrentfreak.com/google-asked-to-remove-
18-pirate-links-every-second-150802 [https://perma.cc/EXE3-QWW6].
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Figure 2: Distribution of Requests Filed with Google for 
Removal of Webpages from Search Results Worldwide, July 2011–
December 2013
To appreciate the robustness of online enforcement, it is interesting 
to compare these figures with enforcement efforts taking place in courts. 
Only 99 copyright lawsuits concerning online infringement were filed 
in Israel during the same period of time, and overall, between 2010 and 
2013 only 273 lawsuits concerning online copyright infringement were 
filed in Israeli courts.95
2. System Abuse
The analysis of removal requests filed with Google (Figure 3)
highlights one of the most serious dangers stemming from the lack of 
oversight: abuse of the N&TD procedure. Our study shows that this 
procedure could easily be abused, and was frequently applied to remove 
materials that did not infringe copyright and were not suspected of 
copyright violation. 
As shown in Figure 3, only 34 percent of removal requests 
concerned allegations of copyright infringement, while the remaining 66
                                                                                                                  
95 See Sharon Bar-Ziv & Niva Elkin-Koren, Between Two Arenas: Online Copyright 
Enforcement, 48 HEBREW U. L. REV. (Mishpatim) (forthcoming 2018) (Hebrew) (manuscript at 20) 
(comparing empirical findings regarding copyright enforcement in Israeli courts with copyright 
enforcement by online intermediaries). 
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percent pertained to other claims such as alleged inaccuracies, 
falsehoods, or violations of other rights. These non-copyright-related 
requests apparently sought to defend the sender’s reputation against 
what was presumed to be defamatory, misleading, or partial 
information.96 For the most part, these requests resembled claims raised 
under the “right to be forgotten.” This right, which was upheld by the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ), allows EU citizens and residents to 
request the removal of links to certain reputation-damaging content from 
the search results for searches using the individual’s name.97 The ECJ 
held that since search engines are the “controllers” in the “processing of 
personal data,”98 they must exclude results “where they appear to be 
inadequate, irrelevant or no longer relevant, or excessive in relation to 
those purposes and the light of the time that has elapsed,” unless there 
are specific reasons justifying their existence on the internet.99
While the right to be forgotten was adopted by courts in the 
European Union, the United States has taken a different approach to 
search engines.100 United States law has generally sought to encourage 
online intermediaries to act as neutral facilitators of content by 
insulating them from liability for harmful content posted by their 
users.101 In fact, except for the safe-harbor provisions of the DMCA, 
U.S. law provides wholesale immunity to online intermediaries. Section 
230 of the Communications Decency Act exempts an “interactive
computer service” from any liability for injurious content published by 
its users.102 This provision has been interpreted by courts quite broadly,
and was upheld by courts even where service providers had knowledge 
of defamatory content on their service.103 This statutory immunity 
                                                                                                                  
96 The targeted content was mainly blog posts, which referred directly to the individual, his 
alleged academic education, and his state of health.
97 The “right to be forgotten” was first recognized by the European Court of Justice concerning 
Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Proteccion de Datos (AEPD), 2014 EUR-
Lex 317 (May 13, 2014) [hereinafter Google Spain Case]. It has not yet been recognized by U.S. 
law, on the basis of which the principles underlying Google Search Engine’s N&TD procedures 
were designed.
98 Within the meaning of the E.U. Data Protection Directive, Article 2(d). Council Directive 
95/46, art. 2(d), O.J. (L 281) 31.
99 See Google Spain Case, supra note 101.
100 See generally Leslie E. Minora, U.S. Courts Should Not Let Europe’s “Right to be 
Forgotten” Force the World to Forget, 89 TEMPLE L. REV. 609 (2017).
101 See Nicholas W. Bramble, Safe Harbors and the National Information Infrastructure,
64 HASTINGS L.J. 325 (2013); Eric Goldman, Unregulating Online Harassment,
87 DENV. U.L. REV. 59, 60 (2010) (arguing that immunity under § 230 played a major role in the 
rise of social media platforms and user-generated content).
102 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) (2012). Pursuant to § 230, no provider of an “interactive computer 
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of information provided by another information 
content provider.” Id. at § 230(c)(1).
103 Zeran v. Am. Online, 129 F.3d 327, 333 (4th Cir. 1997).
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explicitly excludes any liability arising from intellectual property 
infringement.104 In such cases, liability of online intermediaries for 
copyright-infringing materials posted by their users is governed by the 
DMCA. Google’s N&TD mechanism, which is designed to comply with 
the DMCA, was clearly not intended to address complaints regarding 
personal data and personal reputation. In fact, Google seems to refrain 
from taking any measures with respect to inappropriate content 
complaints.105
Figure 3: Types of Notices, May–October 2013
Another surprising finding revealed by the data is that about 65
percent of the requests originated from a single source which filed 
approximately 6,500 removal requests with Google, the vast majority of 
which were non-copyright-related, as described above.106
                                                                                                                  
104 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit or expand 
any law pertaining to intellectual property.”).
105 According to U.S. law, an intermediary does not have the responsibility of a publisher to 
the content it carries, and therefore is not obliged to act to remove content, except for intellectual 
property infringement. See id. at § 230 (stating that interactive service providers or end users will 
not be considered publishers or speakers of questionable content coming from another content 
provider).
106 See supra Part II.B.2.
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A similar phenomenon of a significant impact by a single player was 
identified by Urban, Karaganis, and Schofield. That study identified an 
individual who sent 52.9 percent of the overall removal requests in the 
sample.107 Most of the requests pointed to allegedly defamatory, 
harassing, slanderous, or threatening written materials.108 These findings 
demonstrate the ease whereby online activities can be dominated and 
shaped by solo players and strategic users.109
Overall, these findings raise serious concerns regarding the integrity 
of online copyright enforcement. This robust system, which enables the 
removal and blocking of access to online materials without any legal 
oversight, is vulnerable to abuse. The findings demonstrate that some 
players use the system to achieve other goals, unrelated to copyright, 
and could in fact restrict the availability of content online without any 
scrutiny. This vulnerability of the N&TD procedure may carry 
substantive implications for freedom of speech and the rule of law.110
3. The Blockbuster Filers
A copyright owner who seeks to enforce her rights in court may face
many barriers. Filing a lawsuit requires awareness and knowledge of 
rights and legal procedures, access to legal advice, and most 
importantly, resources to cover the court’s and the attorney’s fees.111
Ostensibly, the digital environment was expected to make things better. 
The N&TD procedures intended to facilitate an immediate removal 
following the filing of a takedown notice by the right holder. The 
procedures of filing a complaint are accessible from every computer 
through Google’s legal support page.112 The process itself is relatively 
simple, fast, and inexpensive. Consequently, one would expect that the 
N&TD procedure would be self-administered by copyright holders and 
would equally serve a variety of players, including large corporations, 
small business, and independent creators. Surprisingly, however,
individual copyright owners constitute a very small percentage of all 
filers of removal requests. The prominent filers with Google from May 
to October 2013 were large private companies (2,483 removal requests 
                                                                                                                  
107 Urban, Karaganis & Schofield, supra note 3, at 99.
108 Id. at 99–100.
109 See infra Part III.A.
110 See id.
111 ETHAN KATSH & ORNA RABINOVICH-EINY, DIGITAL JUSTICE: TECHNOLOGY AND THE 
INTERNET OF DISPUTES 39 (2017); William C. Vickrey et al., Access to Justice: A Broader 
Perspective, 42 LOY. L.A.L. REV. 1147, 1154 (2009).
112 Legal Removal Requests, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/legal/answer/3110420?
visit_id=1-636189462694096301-2192086536&rd=1 [https://perma.cc/RJ57-9EMV] (last visited 
Sept. 13, 2017).
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out of a total of 3,384; approximately 73 percent of all requests).113 Only 
in a few cases were the N&TD procedures used by private individuals 
(36 removal requests out of a total of 3,384; approximately 1 percent).114
Moreover, the filing of notices under the N&TD regime has now 
turned into an industry. As demonstrated in Figure 6, nowadays,
removal requests are largely managed by professional agents.
Figure 4: Prominent Filers of Requests for Removal of Search 
Results, May–October 2013
One possible explanation for the significantly low share of 
individuals in the overall filing of removal notices is a lack of 
motivation. Individual copyright holders might be less motivated to 
remove allegedly infringing materials, since they often lack any business 
model for commercializing their copyrighted works.115 It might also be 
that some business models are based on viral distribution of content and 
benefit from advertising fees.116 In such instances, individual rights 
                                                                                                                  
113 See infra Figure 4.
114 See id.
115 LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX: MAKING ART AND COMMERCE THRIVE IN THE HYBRID 
ECONOMY (2008); Steven Hetcher, User-Generated Confusion: The Legal and Business 
Implications of Web 2.0, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 863, 874–75 (2008).
116 Niva Elkin-Koren, User-Generated Platforms, in WORKING WITHIN THE BOUNDARIES OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 111, 115 
(Rochelle C. Dreyfuss et al., eds., 2010).
2483
381
218 127 112 36 32 2
n = 3,384
364 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:2
holders simply lack the motivation to enforce their rights, and may 
refrain from taking action against unauthorized copying. 
Another possible explanation for the dominance of corporate 
players may concern new barriers to justice, underscored by the digital 
environment. These may include a lack of sufficient awareness of the 
digital proceedings and knowledge gaps between individuals and 
corporate players pertaining to the scope of rights, the available 
procedures for enforcing rights, and the use of these procedures. Indeed, 
individuals may often learn about the N&TD procedures online, yet the 
type of information available online varies from one platform to another; 
also, detection of infringement activity and filing a removal request 
require knowledge and skills. Moreover, the need to handle the sheer 
volume of potentially infringing materials and to address piracy on a 
global scale has generated expertise, and apparently has created some 
advantages for repeat players.117
Analysis of the prominent players that filed removal requests with 
Google during the study period (Figure 5) indicates that most removal 
requests were filed for software copyright enforcement, as the largest 
repeat filer, Microsoft (with 1,806 requests, 53 percent of all copyright 
requests), was followed by Adobe118 and TheEsa,119 albeit at much lower 
rates (16 percent and 9 percent, respectively).
                                                                                                                  
117 See Urban, Karaganis & Schofield, supra note 3, at 52–53 (indicating that the number of 
OSPs that implement automatic methods to remove allegedly infringing materials represents a
minority of the respondent OSPs—only nine of twenty-nine employed any of the enforcement 
measures—but these nine are “some of the dominant Internet services in their respective areas”).
118 ADOBE, http://www.adobe.com/il_en/ [https://perma.cc/E27M-69VB] (last visited 
Sept. 14, 2017).
119 ENTERTAINMENT SOFTWARE ASSOCIATION, http://www.theesa.com/ [https://perma.cc/
PF9D-3WT3] (last visited Sept. 14, 2017).
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Figure 5: Prominent Players Who Filed Requests for the 
Removal of Search Results, May–October 2013
Figure 6 shows that most of the requests were filed through rights-
enforcement service agents, mainly those specializing in copyright-
enforcement services (about 82 percent). These agents are repeat 
players, filing multiple removal requests, and most likely have 
significant expertise in these procedures.120 The rise of enforcement 
agents coincides with the dramatic rise in the scope of removal requests 
filed by copyright holders, and the shift to automatic enforcement 
procedures (robo notices).121 In fact, the shift to management of removal 
requests through agents reflects a significant change in the N&TD 
regime. It shows that online enforcement has become a professional 
                                                                                                                  
120 Under § 512 of the DMCA, removal requests must be filed by the copyright owner or any 
person authorized to act on their behalf. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3) (2012). See also Jennifer M. Urban, 
Brianna L. Schofield & Joe Karaganis, supra note 63 (demonstrating also high rate of repeat players 
in Google Images notices, but twith different profile from the professionalized Google Sear filers).
121 Similar findings were reported by Urban, Karaganis & Schofield. See Urban, Karaganis 
& Schofield, supra note 3, at 84 (reporting that around 92 percent of the removal requests were 
filed by agents, approximately 49 percent of them being copyright-enforcement organizations). 
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specialty which involves some expertise. It may further indicate the 
power disparities between copyright enforcers, who are systematically 
engaged in targeting allegedly infringing materials at a global scale, and 
the targeted users. 
Figure 6: Sender and Principal Characteristics: Agent Type, 
May–October 2013
4. Who Are the Alleged Infringers?
The study identified the targets of copyright removal requests 
which, in most cases, were online forums dominated by a handful of 
websites. Most of the alleged infringing activity targeted by rights 
holders in this study was apparently conducted on only two main sites, 
as presented in Figure 7.
This finding is intriguing. If rights holders sought to achieve 
efficient enforcement, why bother implementing a robust system for 
detecting infringing materials, locating infringing URLs, and filing 
notices with online intermediaries, rather than undertaking more specific 
enforcement proceedings against these hosting sites only? In other 
words, the findings show that in many cases, copyright holders who 
sought to enforce their rights could have approached the infringing sites 
directly, without the need to file a removal request with Google.
There are several possible explanations for these findings. One is 
the gatekeeping function of online intermediaries. Search engines—in 
this case, Google—provide gateways to online content. Google locates
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relevant information sought by the search request. Consequently, it is 
assumed that once infringing copies are no longer indexed by Google, 
users, or at least most users, will not find the infringing copies hosted on 
those URLs. It transpired, however, that allegedly infringing activity 
took place at several dominant websites, and users seeking infringing 
materials probably knew how to approach them directly without going 
through any search engine first. This could render the entire strategy 
futile. 
Another possible explanation is path dependency of professional 
enforcement agents. As noted above, most online enforcement activity 
is managed by professional enforcement agents who operate at a global
scale. Their practices involve automated detection of infringing activity 
by crawlers, which generate a list of URLs which is then embedded in a 
standard notice filed with Google. A typical notice may include dozens 
or even hundreds of URLs located in various domains across the globe.
Such large scale automated procedures are less likely to be attentive to 
local infringing hubs (“red-flag” sites).
Finally, if professional agencies are paid to file notices, and their 
performance is measured by detection and filing, they may have the 
incentive to repeat the same without directly addressing the enforcement 
challenge by blocking the red-flag sites. This raises an interesting 
question regarding the safe-harbor eligibility of an online intermediary 
that receives repeat notices against red-flag sites. Copyright holders 
have argued that the safe harbor does not apply to an OSP who had red 
flag awareness of infringing acts.122 Another threshold to safe harbor is 
implementing “a policy that provides for the termination in appropriate 
circumstance of subscribers and accounts holders . . . who are repeat 
infringers.”123 Yet, when copyright holders fail to take measures against 
red-flag sites and repeat infringers, it seems unreasonable to require an 
OSP to do the same.
                                                                                                                  
122 The interpretation of “red-flag” knowledge under § 512(c)(1)(A) has been addressed by 
the courts in several cases. See, e.g., Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 30–31
(2d Cir. 2012) (holding that “red-flag” knowledge refers to an objective standard); 
UMG Recordings Inc. v. Shelter Cap. Partners LLC, 718 F.3d 1006, 1025–26 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(holding that copyright holders who are seeking to establish knowledge must use the statutory
notification procedure). 
123 17 U.S.C. § 512(i).
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Figure 7: Identity of Targets, May–October 2013
5. Copyright Subject Matter
The study found that the vast majority of copyright removal notices 
filed with Google regarding .il websites addressed software 
infringement (87 percent). The rest were divided among books, audio, 
audio-visual/video works, and photographs.
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Figure 8: Allegedly Infringing Subject Matter, May–October 
2013
That is not to say that all copyright disputes pertaining to online 
infringement concern software. Comparing our findings in this study 
with the lawsuits pertaining to online infringement filed in courts during 
the same period reveals a division of labor between online enforcement 
via intermediaries and the enforcement in courts. While software was 
almost absent from lawsuits filed in court (only 1 percent), other types 
of copyrighted subject matter were more likely to be litigated in court. 
The study, which was conducted in Israel, found that 57 percent of the 
lawsuits involving online copyright infringement concerned 
photographs, 25 percent text,124 7 percent video content, and 3 percent
music.125
6. The Effectiveness of N&TD 
The findings on the effectiveness of online copyright enforcement 
are surprising. Figure 9 shows that in 85 percent of cases, the link to the 
allegedly infringing materials is still live after a removal request, albeit 
not in Google search. In other words, while the link most likely does not 
appear in Google search results following the removal requests, the 
content can still be accessed through a direct link. In attempts to access 
the allegedly infringing materials, an error message appears in only 8
                                                                                                                  
124 Articles and reports that appeared on commercial sites, marketing texts, and more.
125 See Sharon Bar-Ziv & Niva Elkin-Koren, supra note 99 at 28.
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percent of cases, and in another 5 percent the content is not available 
online.126
It can be argued that these findings are not indicative of limited 
effectiveness. As long as the link to the allegedly infringing materials 
does not appear in Google search, for all intents and purposes it is 
nonexistent—as the saying goes, “If you aren’t there, you don’t exist.”
However, because most allegedly infringing materials are distributed 
through two leading sites that constitute approximately 79 percent of all 
removal requests,127 it is simply unnecessary to access these sites via 
Google search. Users who seek infringing materials might be familiar 
with these sites, which presumably obviates the need for search engine 
mediation. Moreover, as most cases of allegedly infringing materials 
content refer to software, as seen in Figure 8, it is safe to assume that 
potential consumers of this content are well aware of access options 
other than Google’s search engine
At the same time, however, removal of links from Google search 
results may assist in reducing the exposure of infringing websites to new 
audiences, thereby slowing down the growth of infringing 
communities.128
                                                                                                                  
126 See infra Figure 9. An interesting experiment shows that only 50 percent of video-sharing 
sites and 12.5 percent of photo-sharing sites remove allegedly infringing content following a 
removal request. Maayan Perel & Niva Elkin-Koren, Black Box Tinkering: Beyond Disclosure in 
Algorithmic Enforcement, 69 FLA. L. REV. 181, 208 (2017).
127 See supra Figure 7.
128 See Section 512 of Title 17: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Prop. 
& the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 11 (2014) (statement of Sean M. 
O’Connor, Professor of Law, University of Washington (Seattle)) (addressing one N&TD 
enforcement problem he called “the relentless reposting of blatantly infringing material”).
2018] BEHIND THE SCENES OF ONLINE COPYRIGHT ENFORCEMENT 371
Figure 9: Is the Link Live? May–October 2013
7. Counter Notices
As explained earlier, the counter notice is extremely important to 
protect the right of the alleged infringer not to have his content removed 
without legal justification. This procedure is also intended to protect the 
public interest in preventing groundless or arbitrary restrictions on the 
availability of noninfringing materials and to secure freedom of 
expression. 
In practice, however, the effectiveness of the counter notice 
mechanism is limited. To qualify for safe harbor, intermediaries are 
required to remove content immediately upon receiving a notice, 
without waiting for counter notices.129
What’s more, users whose content was targeted by a removal 
request often lack knowledge or experience in dealing with copyright 
issues, and therefore may not fully grasp the significance of a counter 
notice procedure. They might also be deterred by the risk associated with 
                                                                                                                  
129 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii).
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exposure to litigation.130 Intermediaries have also reported their concern 
about restoring online access to allegedly infringing materials following 
a counter notice although the law explicitly exempts them from liability 
in cases where the material is indeed infringing.131
This study found that not a single counter notice was filed in 
response to the removal requests evaluated.132 This is not surprising,
since the DMCA does not require search engines to notify alleged 
infringers that the link to the material has been removed.133
Consequently, Google has no duty to notify the provider of content that 
a link to her materials has been removed. 
In the absence of such notification, the alleged infringer may remain 
unaware that the content does not appear in Google search results.
Content providers are unlikely to check routinely that all of the content 
they have posted online appears in search results. By the time the alleged 
infringer learns that her content is no longer availbale on the search 
results, the removal of the link may have already caused lasting damage 
unbeknownst to the content provider (for example, in the case of 
competing commercial businesses or removal in the course of election 
campaign).134 Furthermore, in the absence of notification as to why the 
link was removed, alleged infringers or rights holders do not know the 
reasons for the removal and cannot defend themselves. Recognizing that 
a specific link has been removed and understanding that the cause for 
removal was copyright related are both essential preconditions for 
targeted users, as well as third parties, to contest the removal of their 
links. 
Thus, while the counter notice procedure is available, in practice,
counter notices are rarely filed, and intermediaries tend to view them as 
irrelevant.
                                                                                                                  
130See Removing Content from Google, GOOGLE,  https://support.google.com/legal/
troubleshooter/1114905?rd=2#ts=1115655%2C1614942 [https://perma.cc/8R3Q-V2PM] (last 
visited Feb. 27, 2018). The form includes a warning regarding the legal consequences from abusing 
the process of counter notice.
131 Urban, Karaganis & Schofield, supra note 3, at 44–45.
132 This finding is consistent with a similar study conducted in the United States. See id. at 95 
(reviewing results of a study on DMCA notices that found that “counter notices are rarely used”).
133 While hosting services (e.g., a website, a social media platform) are required to take 
“reasonable steps promptly to notify the subscriber that it has removed or disabled access to the 
material,” 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(2)(A), the DMCA does not apply a similar notification requirement 
to search engines. See id. at § 512(d) (listing the requirements for search engines to avoid liability 
for infringement by users).
134 See John Tehranian, The New Censorship, 101 IOWA L. REV. 245 (2015); see also
Sag, supra note 9 at 506. 
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8. Questionable Removals
The large-scale use of the N&TD regime often raises concerns over 
accuracy of removals.135 As noted previously, 66 percent of all removal 
requests were non-copyright-related.136
However, out of the remaining 34 percent of removal requests
concerning copyright infringement, a high percentage of targeted 
materials were likely infringing. In 88 percent of the removal requests, 
the allegedly infringing material was indeed likely to infringe copyright, 
with more than 50 percent of the original content having been copied by
the allegedly infringing material.137 Since the vast majority of removal 
requests explored in this study targeted infringing copies of software,138
the original content was presumably copied in full, thus demonstrating 
complete overlap between the original content and the allegedly 
infringing materials. This may also explain the significant paucity of 
counter notices, as providers of pirated copies lack any legal ground for 
contesting the removal. Arguably, these findings reflect a situation 
where requests for content removal from Google search results are filed 
only in cases where the rights holders are quite certain that their rights 
have been infringed. A more likely explanation, however, is that this 
high level of presumably legitimate removal requests derives from the 
fact that the vast majority of removal requests were targeting illegal 
copies of software.139
                                                                                                                  
135 See id. at 116 (explaining the significant decrease in substantive accuracy of takedown 
requests that arises when rights holders use automated large-scale takedown notice tools). This 
problem is compounded when one considers the absence of counter notices. See supra note 138
and accompanying text.
136 See supra Figure 3.
137 See infra Figure 10.
138 See supra Figure 8.
139 There is evidence of removal requests originating accidentally. See, e.g., Andy Maxwell, 
Harry Potter Publisher Goes on a Bizarre Anti-Piracy Rampage, TORRENTFREAK (Apr. 14, 2016), 
https://torrentfreak.com/harry-potter-publisher-goes-on-a-bizarre-anti-piracy-rampage-160414
[https://perma.cc/D7XB-YGPC] (describing instances in which removal requests attributed 
copyright infringement to the content creators themselves). There is also evidence of requests 
submitted to remove nonexistent or unavailable content. See, e.g., Ernesto Van der Sar, After 4 
Years . . . Copyright Holders Still Think Megaupload Is Alive, TORRENTFREAK (Apr. 17, 2016), 
https://torrentfreak.com/after-4-years-copyright-holders-still-think-megaupload-is-alive-160417
[https://perma.cc/DH5Y-6NHF] (describing instances in which removal requests targeted content 
that had not been available online for many years).
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Figure 10: How Much of the Allegedly Infringing Work (AIW)
Do the Allegedly Infringing Materials Appear to Copy? May–
October 2013
As shown in Figure 10, in 4 percent of cases, the allegedly infringing 
materials appeared to copy less than 50 percent of the original content.
In an additional 5 percent of cases, the allegedly infringing materials 
likely did not infringe on any copyright. Overall, the findings show that 
less than 10 percent of copyright removal requests were questionable. 
By comparison, the study of Urban, Karaganis, and Schofield indicates 
that a significant percentage (36.3 percent) of removal requests were 
questionable.140 
In the absence of legal oversight of removed content, questionable
requests pertaining to potentially legitimate content add to the concerns 
                                                                                                                  
140 Urban, Karaganis & Schofield, supra note 3, at 106.
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created by overbroad copyright claims.141 This becomes an alarming 
concern, as there is increased evidence for abusive use of the N&TD 
regime alongside evidence of mistargeting of content authorized by the 
rights holders, or rights holders directly targeting their own works.142
This too might have far-reaching implications for free speech when the 
removal requests are motivated by political interests, especially during 
election campaign seasons.143
III. LESSONS DRAWN FROM N&TD PRACTICES AND 
IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY
The study described in this Article provides a rich picture of the 
actual use of the N&TD procedures for online copyright enforcement.
The findings shed light on the great transformation in law-enforcement 
strategies in the digital era, shifting toward automated enforcement 
procedures, which are implemented by online intermediaries.
As discussed in the following sections, these changes may have 
significant implications for access to knowledge and freedom of speech, 
for achieving the goals of copyright law, and for access to justice and 
due process. By studying the invisible dynamics at work, the findings of 
this study demonstrate the unintended consequences of implementing 
enforcement procedures by online intermediaries, which are simply 
asked to comply with the N&TD regime. These findings may thus offer 
new insights to policymakers in designing regulation for other areas of 
law enforcement.
A. Implications for Access to Knowledge and Freedom of Speech 
The study discussed in this Article demonstrated the robustness of 
online copyright enforcement.144 Requests to remove allegedly 
infringing materials from search results are becoming increasingly 
popular compared to the much lower rate of copyright infringement 
lawsuits.145
                                                                                                                  
141 Rebecca Tushnet, Fair Use’s Unfinished Business, 15 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 399, 
399–400 (2016).
142 See id. at 401 (“Overbroad matching algorithms lead copyright owners to send takedown 
notices targeting mere reporting on their works, and even to demand takedowns of links to their 
own websites.”).
143 See id. at 402 (explaining that during election campaign seasons, “takedown requests can 
suppress the most effective . . . means of communicating political messages” due to the DMCA’s 
minimum ten-business-day delay before counter notices become effective). See supra Part III.A.
144 See supra Figure 1.
145 See supra Part II.B.1 (highlighting the discrepancy between online enforcement activity 
and lawsuits relating to online copyright infringement). 
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In recent years, many scholars have raised the concern that the 
N&TD procedures will be misused to dampen free expression.146 Our
study provides strong empirical evidence to support this concern. The 
vast majority (66 percent) of removal requests analyzed in this study 
targeted noninfringing materials.147 Even among the copyright-related 
removal requests, in some cases, the targeted content was not necessarily 
infringing.148 Urban, Karaganis, and Schofield found a 36.3 percent rate 
of questionable removal requests.149 Another study, analyzing over 50
million removal requests, indicated that even the most forgiving 
measures showed that 8.3 percent had serious technical errors and 1.3
percent had substantive errors.150
There are many anecdotal incidents where notices have been filed 
to remove legitimate content, such as fair use. For instance, a twenty-
nine-second home video of the dancing baby of the Lenz family, where 
two toddlers are seen dancing in the family’s kitchen to the song “Let’s 
Go Crazy” by Prince, was removed from YouTube following a 
takedown notice issued by Universal Music. This video was later held 
by the Ninth Circuit to be fair use.151 Copyright notices were also filed 
by Samsung to block parodies pertaining to the Samsung Note 7 
phone,152 and by Sony Music against the use of short musical samples 
                                                                                                                  
146 See, e.g., M. Margaret McKeown, Keynote Address, Censorship in the Guise of 
Authorship: Harmonizing Copyright and the First Amendment, 15 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 1, 
2, 5 (2016) (discussing theories of tension between intellectual property rights and freedom of 
speech, and articulating her own); Sag, Internet Safe Harbors, supra note 9, at 15–16 (describing 
free-speech ramifications of the DMCA’s incentives).
147 See supra Figure 3.
148 As discussed above, the present study’s findings indicate that most of the materials targeted 
by copyright removal notices were indeed infringing. At the same time, these removal requests 
amount to about one third of the overall requests studied. See supra Part II.C.3. One should bear in
mind that most of the cases in this study involve software infringement. See supra Part II.C.5; supra
Figure 8. Hence, in online infringements involving software, it is simpler to identify copyright 
infringement and copying may provoke less controversy than in cases involving content such as 
music or photography.
149 Urban, Karaganis & Schofield, supra note 3, at 106.
150 Daniel Seng, “Who Watches the Watchmen?”: An Empirical Analysis of Errors in DMCA 
Takedown Notices, 7, 32, 45–46 (Jan. 23, 2015), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2563202
[https://perma.cc/788K-E82Y]; Tushnet, supra note 148, at 400.
151 Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 801 F.3d 1126, 1129–30 (9th Cir. 2015), amended and 
superseded on denial of reh’g, 815 F.3d 1145 (9th Cir. 2016). 
152 James Titcomb, Samsung Attempts to Take Down Parody Note 7 Bomb GTA Videos,
THE TELEGRAPH (Oct. 21, 2016, 8:21 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2016/10/21/
samsung-attempts-to-take-down-parody-gta-videos-with-note-7-bomb [https://perma.cc/2YGF-
NCH3]. In this case, gamers made modifications to the video game Grand Theft Auto V, depicting 
the game’s sticky bomb weapons replaced with exploding Samsung Galaxy Note 7 devices.
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during a lecture which was uploaded to YouTube.153 This is 
notwithstanding that all of these uses are presumably fair.
Overall, the N&TD regime has become a fertile ground for 
illegitimate censorship and removal of potentially legitimate materials. 
The strong incentives of online intermediaries to remove materials upon 
receiving a notice, without exercising any discretion regarding the 
claim, enable an easy channel of misuse. 
The study demonstrates the vulnerability of the N&TD procedure to 
strategic use that seeks to remove sensitive information or particular 
types of content. The fact that requests to remove noninfringing 
materials were submitted by a single entity154 underscores the ability of 
a strategic player (such as a state actor or large corporation and even a 
single individual), to exert a wide-ranging impact by, in effect, taking 
advantage of the enforcement system created by the statute. Such 
strategic use of the system may allow the removal of any undesired 
content, unflattering postings, competing materials of competitors, or 
politically controversial materials.155 Since the N&TD procedures are 
implemented in a nontransparent way,156 it is difficult to track such 
misuse. Moreover, since the N&TD procedures involve an immediate 
remedy (removal) but lack any legal oversight, there are no effective 
means to protect against abuse of the process. We currently lack 
sufficient measures for detecting and preventing this type of misuse.157
As long as the automatic enforcement system does not distinguish 
legitimate removal requests from noncopyright requests, there is a great 
potential for misuse. 
The massive removal of noninfringing materials, as demonstrated 
by this study, may carry serious implications for access to knowledge 
and freedom of speech. The ability to remove materials by simply 
issuing a notice creates a powerful mechanism for removing online 
content. The online environment serves as a major source of news, 
knowledge, and data. It is a vital source of information for consumers 
                                                                                                                  
153 Mike Masnick, Sony Music Issues Takedown on Copyright Lecture About Music 
Copyrights by Harvard Law Professor, TECHDIRT (Feb. 16, 2016, 9:21 AM),
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20160214/08293233599/sony-music-issues-takedown-
copyright-lecture-about-music-copyrights-harvard-law-professor.shtml [https://perma.cc/A9A2-
XUSL].
154 See supra Part II.B.2 (“[A]bout 65% of the requests originated from a single source, which 
filed approximately 6500 removal requests with Google, the vast majority of which were non-
copyright-related, as described above.”).
155 See Tushnet, supra note 148, at 402 (presenting examples of takedown requests motivated 
by improper commercial or political interests, such as “to suppress discussion of [a business’s] 
products or those of their competitors” or to target government critics in Argentina and Ecuador).
156 See Perel & Elkin-Koren, supra note 15, at 505–06, 513 (describing the lack of 
transparency in the practices of intermediaries and the procedures of enforcement algorithms).
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who make commercial choices and market transactions, and for citizens 
who wish to participate in democratic deliberation. 
The N&TD regime shapes the availability of content online, by 
enabling an unwarranted removal. Moreover, the lack of legal or public 
oversight of content removal activity may seriously endanger freedom 
of expression and free competition.158
B. Implications for Copyright Goals 
The purpose of the copyright law is to “enrich[ ] the general public 
through access to creative works.”159 As the Supreme Court in Sony
explained, the law aims at striking a balance “between the interests of 
authors and inventors in the control and exploitation of their writings 
and discoveries on the one hand, and society’s competing interest in the 
free flow of ideas, information, and commerce on the other hand.”160
The N&TD regime intended to serve these copyright goals. On the 
one hand, it sought to strengthen copyright enforcement by enabling 
copyright holders to obtain a swift removal of infringing materials.161
Digital enforcement by online intermediaries was presumably an 
attractive solution to the challenges of enforcing copyright in digital 
networks. The ease of copying and distributing copyrighted materials by 
every end user of the network made it extremely difficult to identify, 
litigate, and obtain damages for copyright infringement. Enforcement 
by online intermediaries addresses this difficulty by providing an 
incentive to collaborate with rights holders in detecting and removing 
allegedly infringing materials without resorting to the courts.162 At the 
same time, the N&TD regime sought to enable access to creative works 
by limiting the liability of online intermediaries. The goal was to 
encourage the development of interactive services that would facilitate 
creation and dissemination of creative works by users.163
The present study shows that these goals were only partially 
achieved. For copyright holders, the DMCA was meant to secure an 
                                                                                                                  
158 See also Azurmendi, supra note 2, at 43; . Sag, Internet Safe Harbors, supra note 9, at   
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efficient remedy against piracy. Indeed, the N&TD regime offered 
copyright holders an accessible mechanism for a swift removal of 
infringing content. Yet, the effectiveness of such removal was only 
partial. The findings raise doubts regarding the effectiveness of the 
N&TD enforcement procedures. They show that in most cases the 
allegedly infringing materials are still available online and can be 
accessed directly, even after a notice and removal of the link by 
Google.164 One could argue that in many cases such failure to remove 
the infringing source is not necessarily ineffective. The reason is that the 
removal of links in Google search results may reduce overall traffic to 
the infringing websites. However, it is reasonable to assume that 
interested users can reach the relevant websites without any need for 
Google or other search engine mediation.165
From the perspective of access, the N&TD regime is not sufficiently 
equipped to secure adequate access to copyrighted materials. 
Copyright law intends to promote progress, not only by securing 
incentives to authors but also by ensuring the freedom of current and 
future authors to use existing works and build upon them.166 As recently 
explained by the Supreme Court in Kirtsaeng v. Wiley,167 copyright law 
is “striking a balance between encouraging and rewarding authors’ 
creations and enabling others to build on that work.”168 To ensure 
sufficient access, copyright protection is limited by fundamental 
balancing rules, and by limitations and exceptions. Fair use serves as a 
check on copyright to make sure it does not stifle the very creativity that 
the law seeks to foster.169 It is also considered one of the safety valves 
which allows copyright protection to coexist with freedom of 
expression.170 Therefore, to protect freedom of speech within copyright 
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law, the fair use doctrine authorizes the court to permit certain 
unlicensed uses in order to secure freedom of speech, notwithstanding 
the limits on expression created by copyright.171
The findings show that N&TD was used to remove noninfringing 
materials, some of which were presumably fair use.172 This adds to the 
mounting anecdotal data of removal requests which were targeting fair 
use.173
The study underscores, however, a more profound shortcoming of 
the N&TD regime. The alarming findings on large-scale use of N&TD 
to remove noncopyrighted materials shows the potential risk of enabling 
a removal without any sufficient oversight. Since achieving the goals of 
copyright law depends on securing a balance between securing 
incentives to authors and ensuring access to copyrighted works, a regime 
that is incapable of ensuring adequate access may hinder the objectives 
of copyright law. 
The N&TD procedure is dominated by rights holders who issue 
notices and online intermediaries that administer these notices and 
execute removals.174 This results in a robust removal system, which 
reflects both rights holders’ judgment about which content to target by 
takedown notices and the choice of online intermediaries how to 
respond, i.e, which content to remove. However, the interests of rights
holders and intermediaries may not always coincide with the goals of 
copyright law.175 Rights holders may seek to remove any unpaid use of 
their content, even where such use might be socially beneficial. Online 
intermediaries may have strong incentives to avoid any litigation over 
copyright claims of users and may also share business interests with 
copyright owners which are using their platforms for commercial 
distribution.  
Assigning to intermediaries the power to enforce and to reach a 
substantive judgment constitutes a typical case of “privatiz[ing] 
justice.”176 This system lacks any in-depth examination of the scope of 
copyright protection, the scope and nature of the allegedly infringing 
activity, and the legitimacy of using the copyrighted materials in any 
given circumstance. Enforcing copyright claims, without considering 
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any copyright principles in implementing enforcement, may lead to the 
removal of noninfringing materials that should otherwise remain 
available online. This may hamper the ability of copyright law to 
achieve its goals through a delicate balance between incentives for
authors and access to copyrighted works.177
Moreover, some intermediaries have surpassed the N&TD 
procedure necessary to obtain a safe harbor, and are now voluntarily 
offering additional enforcement measures to rights holders.178 This 
creates new business opportunities for copyright owners by facilitating 
transactions with unauthorized users, but it may also threaten the 
interests of users in obtaining legitimate access to creative works and 
exercising free speech.179
C. Implications for Access to Justice and Due Process 
The principle of access to justice is designed to ensure that the 
dispute-resolution procedures will be accessible to all, especially 
disadvantaged parties.180 Courts, where copyright was traditionally 
enforced, are often criticized for creating barriers to access to justice.181
These barriers are primarily due to high litigation costs. Litigation in 
court may also reinforce wide gaps in knowledge and access to legal 
counseling in ways that can deter the public from taking advantage of 
judicial procedures established to protect their rights.182
One might have expected that the ease of filing a removal request 
through N&TD procedures would enable rights holders, unaccustomed 
to legal procedures, to receive fast, convenient, inexpensive, and 
effective enforcement of their rights. Likewise, one would expect users 
whose content was targeted by a notice to file a counter notice, which 
presumably involves no cost and no legal expertise. However, a 
surprising finding emerged from this study: N&TD serves mainly large 
players; more specifically, multinational companies.183 These 
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companies generate the vast majority of the removal requests, and these 
requests are filed by rights-enforcement service agents who specialize 
in online copyright enforcement.184 In other words, the online 
adjudication of copyright disputes is still dominated by repeat players 
that acquired the expertise in managing online disputes, while end users 
may still suffer from the power/knowledge gap.185
Another issue is securing due process, namely, the procedural steps 
that are available to the parties. While some procedures are required by 
Constitutional due process, others are assumed as part of a fair system 
for learning and resolving legal disputes.186
The N&TD procedures fail to offer sufficient mechanisms for 
considering the substantive claims of the parties involved, before action 
is taken against allegedly infringing materials. Thus, the link to the 
allegedly infringing materials from a Google search is removed 
automatically upon receipt of the removal request, without any prior 
check of the substantive claims of the parties involved.
Indeed, the DMCA defines a procedure for alleged infringers to 
challenge the removal of allegedly infringing materials by filing a 
counter notice. In practice, however, as shown by this study, this course 
is rarely taken. This may be due to fear of potential consequences
following the filing of a counter notice, lack of knowledge of user rights, 
or lack of legal expertise.187
Moreover, the growing use of voluntary enforcement measures 
offered by online intermediaries creates another layer of challenge to 
due process.188 These voluntary measures are not subject to any of the 
procedural safeguards offered by the safe harbor of the DMCA, and are
often simply governed by the platform’s terms of use. 
Overall, it is necessary to develop policy measures that would ease 
access to digital enforcement procedures and secure the rights of the 
different stakeholders. The N&TD procedures facilitate a fairly liberal, 
cost-free, and minimal-risk legal environment for filers of notices. Since 
removal requests can be freely submitted, policy may need to focus on 
measures that could counterbalance the arbitrary power of notification 
that results in removal. To encourage users to challenge such notices,
policy measures should address the gaps of knowledge and expertise. 
Such gaps could perhaps be narrowed by providing information and 
guidance to individual copyright holders and to users online. While this 
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may not completely eliminate the advantages inherent in using rights-
enforcement service agents, it may at least lessen the imbalance.
CONCLUSIONS
This study offers several insights into the dynamics involving online 
enforcement mediated by intermediaries. First, it demonstrates that the 
safe-harbor regime has failed to adequately advance the overall goals of 
copyright law. It is not disputed that the internet has led to a significant 
increase in the illegal use of content.189 The difficulty of enforcing 
copyright law in the digital era has forced rights holders to develop and 
hone a variety of enforcement strategies. Rights holders sought to 
harness intermediaries to identify, remove, and block allegedly 
infringing materials based on the N&TD regime.190 The N&TD regime 
offered a swift relief to right holders, and the study demonstrated the 
massive use of this statutory procedure. 
Yet, despite the importance attached to the value of intellectual 
property and to the protection of the rights holders’ legitimate interests, 
other considerations are also at play. These considerations include the 
importance of securing access to cultural assets and speech resources, as 
well as the ability to access and freely communicate information 
online.191 The study demonstrated that the safe harbor regime has 
compromised access to legitimate content and thus failed to preserve 
copyright balance.
The second insight derived from this study applies more generally
to the privatization of online enforcement. The attempt to offer 
immediate first aid to rightholders facing piracy, while deferring legal 
disputes to courts at a later stage, has proven futile. In practice, the 
strong incentives for online intermediaries to remove content upon 
receiving a removal request has turned the N&TD regime into a robust 
clean-up mechanism that operates by removing large quantities of 
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allegedly infringing materials automatically, with no consideration of 
copyright principles, and without any judicial oversight.192
Consequently, the N&TD regime results in the unaccountable 
removal of content as documented in this study. This carries serious 
implications for access to knowledge, freedom of speech, and access to 
justice.
Third, this study sheds light on the difficulties involved in 
monitoring the implementation of N&TD procedures. Online 
intermediaries are not subject to any disclosure requirements regarding 
the nature or output of the N&TD procedure. The voluntary GTR, which 
are intended to provide transparent data on this activity, are only partial 
and very difficult to analyze and monitor.193 The analysis of removal 
requests and their outcomes on such a large scale, not only requires 
access to data pertaining to the enforcement activity, but also an 
enormous investment of resources. In the absence of access to data and 
transparency regarding the implementation of N&TD by each and every 
intermediary, we cannot expect independent data to shed light on the 
ramifications of online-enforcement actions. Therefore, it might be 
necessary to design new measures for oversight, beyond self-reporting 
and transparency.194
Increasing collaboration between online intermediaries and 
copyright holders, in copyright enforcement, could further jeopardize 
access to online materials and free flow of information. Such 
cooperation in enforcing rights outside the courts lacks any assurances 
for access to knowledge and freedom of speech. This can be especially 
dangerous in the absence of any oversight regarding the scope of 
cooperation between intermediaries and rights holders in enforcement 
campaigns, and in the absence of any judicial oversight over the 
implementation of enforcement measures.195
The robustness of the N&TD regime and the lack of adequate 
oversight measures, raise concerns regarding potential misuse, and 
limits on free speech and the free flow of information. They underscore 
the need to revisit the legal policy pertaining to online enforcement. 
Such policy should take into account the scale of online disputes and the 
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automation of enforcement measures as described in this Article. In 
particular, this study demonstrated the need to develop oversight 
measures and apply transparency requirements to any form of online 
copyright enforcement. Such oversight has become essential to ensure
the rule of law, where online intermediaries are increasingly burdened
with additional enforcement missions. 
